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This large settlement mound (höyük), originally named Karahöyük in common with many other ancient mounds in Turkey, lies 20 kilometers northeast of the city of Kayseri (Roman Caesarea) in Cappadocia, a short distance southeast of the Kızıl Irmak (Red River), in Hittite times Marrassantiya and in Greco-Roman times Halys. One of the most important excavated sites in Anatolia, Kültepe is of special relevance for this dictionary, owing to its certain identification as the city of Nesa, which in its turn can be equated with Kanes, after Kussara, the first center of Hittite political and military power on the Anatolian plateau. Excavated since 1948 by an expedition directed by Tahsin Özgüç, of the University of Ankara, and sponsored by the Turkish Historical Foundation, it had been the site of earlier excavations between World Wars I and II under Bedrich Hrozny of Prague.

As happens all too often in the Near East, it was through the appearance of antiquities in the markets of Constantinople (Istanbul) and further afield, as well as locally, that scholarly attention was first drawn to south central Anatolia, Cappadocia in GrecoRoman times. Both inscribed clay tablets and distinctive painted pottery surfaced in considerable quantities, some 3,000 tablets in all, both categories being described as “Cappadocian.” This Cappadocian ware is now commonly termed Alışar III ware, having been found in that excavated mound in stratified context. This pottery and these tablets have found their way into a number of museums and private collections around the world, unlike the material from the official excavations at Kültepe, now displayed in Ankara and among the major attractions of the museum. Hrozny, a brilliant philologist, had been led to believe that this was the source of the Cappadocian tablets, though as a field archaeologist he found himself out of his depth. During his campaign of excavations at Kültepe (“ash mound”) he eventually unearthed some 600 tablets, among them finding references which proved he had located the ancient city of Kanes, whose full importance was not yet realized.

It was, however, some time before he stumbled upon the major feature of this large site, the presence at the foot of the main mound of an extensive low platform, not immediately recognizable as an outer, lower area of the town. He might not have located it when he did, had it not been for a disgruntled villager who came to Hrozny and divulged the secret of the area whence his fellow villagers were extracting clay tablets for sale in the markets. This was to prove to be the site of the greatest Old Assyrian trading community (karum), from which some 15,000 tablets and innumerable other finds have subsequently been recovered by the Turkish expedition.

There is a very long sequence of occupation levels in the main mound, or citadel, of Kültepe, from the Chalcolithic period (fourth millennium BC) down into the Iron Age (first millennium BC). For our purposes the strata from the later Early Bronze Age till the end of the Late Bronze Age are especially significant, the Iron Age also being not without interest. It is apparent that the karum of Kanes was first built and inhabited before the arrival of the Assyrian merchants and the organization of the Old Assyrian trade, for the earliest levels (Karum IV­III) are completely devoid of clay tablets. One theory is that tablets of wood, mentioned in later Hittite texts, may have been in use: if so, this would tend to add weight to the suggestion of an Anatolian, more specifically Luwian, presence here. But without further evidence this remains a matter of enlightened guesswork.

The city of Kültepe-Kanes, contemporary with Level II of the karum and thus dating ca.2050­1950 BC or a little later, was protected by two defensive lines, the inner wall being built on large unhewn stones, reused in the later defenses of Kanes IB attributable to Anitta, son of Pithana. Among the buildings excavated in the city is a likely palace, with residential quarters and a large paved open square. A palace and five temples are mentioned in the tablets. The entire city and the karum outside the walls were burnt in a violent destruction, conceivably the result of a Hittite attack, although Anitta’s association with Kanes IB and the intervening phase of Kanes IC make it chronologically unlikely to have been attributable to Pithana. The stratigraphy of the city, however, does not indicate any desertion of the site between Kanes II and IB, in spite of the destruction of Kanes II. The palace containing tablets of Warsama, king of Kanes, however, most probably belongs to a phase (IC) when the karum was abandoned, and the merchants had withdrawn within the walls of the Anatolian city, if they had not indeed retreated to Assur. A bronze spearhead with typically Anatolian bent tang bearing the inscription “Palace of Anitta the king” was recovered from a public building within the city in Kanes IB context, adding weight to the claims made in the Anitta Text. In the karum of Kanes the orientation of streets and many buildings remained essentially the same from Level II through IB­ IA. The buildings all have andesite footings up to floor level only, with mud-brick walls above, though the stonework was in some places carried higher, as behind kitchen ovens. The whole character of the buildings was Anatolian, with no trace of influence from Assyria, the houses being plastered and whitewashed. There is no evidence of gabled roofs. Details such as door jambs, charred remains of wooden door frames and pivot stones demonstrate the access to buildings. Stone paving was used where water was much in use. The majority of houses in Level II of the karum either have two rooms and a rectangular plan or two rooms opening on to a large main room or many rooms off a corridor. Houses were extended as required, presumably with the growth of the household, often with walls set at irregular angles. The population was evidently increasing. Five districts have been identified in the areas occupied by the merchants’ houses, with varying yields of tablets, while other houses excavated 1.5 kilometers to the south contained none.

The significance of this can only be surmised. The makeup of the population of each district can be estimated from its tablets. Most of the Assyrians lived in the first and second districts, being in the majority in the third and fifth districts, alongside native Anatolian merchants. Only the fourth district was perhaps exclusively Anatolian, and the native houses yielded notably fewer tablets. The major archives were housed in the north, northeast and central areas of the karum.

Another area was devoted to workshops and supporting services in the southeast part of the karum, where native householders mostly dwelt. Workshops occur in widely separated parts of the karum, not grouped all together, though no bit karim has been found, this being known only from the tablets. Much evidence remains to be uncovered in the form of more workshops as well as in the thousands of as yet unpublished tablets, which must include references to copper, gold and silver artifacts. Tools, weapons and decorative items of metal, stone and terracotta were manufactured by the craftsmen, no doubt following traditional practices dating back well before the arrival of the Assyrian merchants.

One workshop of the later period (IB) yielded portable and large fixed molds, crucibles, blow-pipes and pot-bellows, indicating metallurgy on an organized footing. It would be mistaken to suggest that it was solely owing to the arrival of the foreign traders from Assur that the level of sophistication in the economy of central Anatolia was attained. More probably a network of trade routes had evolved through the activities of native Anatolian merchants, with the Assyrian newcomers being adept at profiting from established business networks. Kanes had a long history of urban life, the growth of trade in Anatolia emerging during the Early Bronze III period, whose beginning in the mid­third millennium BC could be said to mark a cultural watershed not repeated until the advent of the Iron Age in the 12th century BC.

The characteristic Alışar III (Cappadocian) ware appears at Kültepe in the levels termed Early and Middle Cappadocian, continuing through the Late Cappadocian phase, which includes the first two levels (IV­III) of the karum of Kanes. This painted pottery underwent three phases of development conforming with the sequence of levels at Kanes. It is noteworthy that it was in the Early Cappadocian phase, long before the arrival of Assyrian merchants, that the Anatolian city contained a public building of megaron plan, either a temple or a palace, suggesting western influence on central Anatolia. Could this have been an outcome of the Luwian migrations? The vicissitudes of Anatolian society, with growing conflicts between the various minor kingdoms perhaps in part stimulated by competition to enjoy the benefits accruing from the presence of foreign merchants able to pay tolls to allow safe passage of their caravans, had driven the Assyrian inhabitants of the karum of Kanes away.

The perimeter wall surrounding the karum of Kanes IB suggests the necessity of effective protection for the merchants returning to Kanes and in fact extending their trade to other merchant colonies. How much significance is to be attached to the smaller number of tablets found in karum IB compared with karum II is not entirely clear. What is evident is that the second period of Assyrian activity at Kanes lasted a shorter time, on the evidence of limmu names on the tablets, than the first period (karum II). After the first destruction the period of desertion of the karum (IC) probably lasted not less than 50 years, seeing that graves of this time dug into the ruins of karum II were evidently unknown to the inhabitants of the reoccupied colony (karum IB), not being robbed of their contents.

Though there are fewer tablets to reveal details of the Old Assyrian trade in the time of karum IB, it would be mistaken to conclude that this trade had shrunk in volume or variety. Two factors indicate the contrary: first, the expansion of the area of the ka- rum of Kanes to a diameter of over one kilometer, within a wall built on a footing of massive andesite blocks, at the same time as the native Anatolian city grew in size; second, the establishment of other trading posts or colonies, each a karum, at Alışar II, Boğazköy (Hattusa) and Acemhöyük (Burushattum).

The relative chronology of Kültepe-Kanes is greatly clarified by limmu names synchronizing Kültepe IB, Alışar II and Tell Chagar Bazar in the Khabur valley with the reign of Samsi-Adad I of Assyria (1813­-1781 BC), overlapping with that of Hammurabi of Babylon (1792­1750 BC). The following absolute chronology for the successive periods of the karum of Kültepe-Kanes therefore seems plausible: Kültepe II, ca.2050/2000­1900 BC; Kültepe IC, ca.1900­1850 BC; Kültepe IB, ca.1850­1800 BC or slightly later; Kültepe IA, ending ca.1750 BC. The final phase of the karum (IA) was but a pale reflection of what had gone before. It was undoubtedly owing to growing unrest and insecurity for the caravans with discord among the Anatolian kingdoms, rather than any economic changes in Assyria, that the Old Assyrian trade finally came to an end. A brief dark age descended upon the Anatolian plateau, to be lifted a century later under Hattusili I. Never again, however, was such a sophisticated commercial network to flourish in the lands destined to come under Hittite rule. The state would step in where the great merchant family firms had once ruled.

In the strict sense (Galatia Proper, Roman Gallograecia) this is the name applied by Greek-speaking peoples to a large inland district of Asia Minor since its occupation by Gaulish tribes in the 3rd century B.C. Bounded on the N. by Bithynia and Paphlagonia, W. by Phrygia, S. by Lycaonia and Cappadocia, E. by Pontus, it included the greater part of the modern vilayet of Angora, stretching from Pessinus eastwards to Tavium and from the Paphlagonian hills N. of Ancyra southwards to the N. end of the salt lake Tatta (but probably including the plains W. of the lake during the greater part of its history), – a rough oblong about 200 m. long and ioo (to 130) broad.

To designate a large province of the Roman empire, including not merely the country Galatia, but also Paphlagonia and parts of Pontus, Phrygia, Pisidia, Lycaonia and Isauria. The name occurs in 1 Corinthians 16:1 Galatians 1:2 1 Peter 1:1, and perhaps 2 Timothy 4:10. Some writers assume that Galatia is also mentioned in Acts 16:6; Acts 18:23; but the Greek there has the phrase “Galatic region” or “territory,” though the English Versions of the Bible has “Galatia”; and it must not be assumed without proof that “Galatic region” is synonymous with “Galatia.” If e.g. a modern narrative mentioned that a traveler crossed British territory, we know that this means something quite different from crossing Britain. “Galatic region” has a different connotation from “Galatia”; and, even if we should find that geographically it was equivalent, the writer had some reason for using that special form.

Given the consonant shift proposed for the Belgae, then ‘Belgae’ would indicate that its ‘b’ replaced an older (?) form of a ‘w’ sound. This supplies ‘Welgae’ as a possible older form of Belgae, and rather astonishingly that ‘wel-‘ sounds incredibly similar to what the Germans call Celts! So the possibility is raised that the original ethnic name was ‘Wel’, and while the Belgae were in northern central Europe this mutated into ‘vel’ and then ‘bel’; while in the west and south the ‘w’ of ‘wel’ acquired a hard ‘k’ or ‘g’ in front of it, to form ‘kwel’ or ‘gwel’, therefore giving rise to words such as ‘celtae’ and ‘galati’. Curiously, a Belgic origin is often claimed for the Galatian Celts. Given the marked Belgic features found in names for the Taurisci and Scordisci, could the entire Balkans settlement by Celts have been of a Belgic origin? Ritual death practices by the Galatians also appears to provide backup for this.

The Tolistoboges (or Tolostobogi), who seem to have been entirely anonymous before the migration, were said by Strabo to have taken their name from their leaders. This indicates a mixed group from several tribes that needed to find its own identity, which explains the tribe’s previous anonymity. Other sources claim the Tolistoboges as the Tolistoboii, a division of the greater Boii. The ‘g’ in ‘boges’ is pronounced as a ‘gh’, a guttural ‘h’. So the tribe would be Tolisto-boii (‘bo-hee’ with a strong ‘h’), thereby supporting both versions of the name – it’s simply down to pronunciation. As far as breaking down the name goes, ‘tolisto-‘ is probably a man’s name, a leader named Tolistos or Tolistorix (a ‘King Tolistos’, possibly the father or grandfather of Brennus?). The proto-Celtic word list has ‘listo’ defined as a nickname without any further explanation, but another section indicates that it might mean an adopted or fostered relative: *(φ?)listo-makʷ(kʷ)o- (?), meaning ‘stepson’. The initial ‘to-‘ is probably the pronoun, ‘you’. The tribe were the ‘Boii of Tolistos’, thereby affirming their link to this large collective.

The Trocmes (or Trocmi, Trogmi) were equally unknown before their migration. Trogmi or Trocmi appears to have some very strange possibilities when it comes to breaking it down. On the one hand it might derive from ‘trougos’, meaning ‘misery’. Or it is more likely to be ‘trokkos’, meaning ‘to bathe’. The ‘m-‘ on the end appears to be a personal pronoun, ‘me’ or ‘mi’. So the most likely meaning is ‘I bathe’, which is good to know! The alternative may mean ‘I am miserable’ or something similar – hardly an inspiring tribal name.

Pliny the Elder mentions the Ambitouti and Voturi, apparently as divisions of the Tolistoboges. The Ambitouti name can be broken into two parts, staring with an old friend, ‘ambi-‘, meaning on both sides, or providing an extended meaning of universally, which is also used by tribes such as the Ambarri, Ambidravi, and Ambisontes. The second part of the name, ‘touti’, means the ‘tribe or folk’. They were probably ‘all of the people’, possibly in the same sense as the Celtic ‘combrogi’, meaning ‘people of the same land’ or more specifically ‘brothers-in-arms, compatriots’, which was used by the Sicambri and others. As for the Voturi, the closest option in proto-Celtic seems to be *wor-tero- < *wer-tero-, meaning ‘noble’. They were ‘the nobles’ or similar.

The Teutobodiaci are another apparent splinter group that is mentioned by Pliny the Elder. Breaking it down, ‘teuto’ is ‘people or tribe’, while ‘bodiaci’ appears to be the name Boudicca (which was also used by the famous queen of the Insular Iceni). The female form is Boudicca, while the male form is Boudiccos. The were ‘the people of Boudiccos’, possibly one of their founding tetrarchs.

The Arecomisci tribe settled a wide swathe of what is now south-eastern France, occupying the entire central and western parts of the later Roman province of Narbonensis. They appear to have been a branch of the widely-travelled Volcae collective, some of which, elements of the Volcae Tectosages, moved to Anatolia. Once there, they and the other Gauls formed capitals for each of their various divisions. The Tectosages were centred on Ancyra (modern Ankara, the Turkish capital). The Tolistoboges located themselves at ancient Gordion (resting place of, arguably, Gordios III of Phrygia). The Trocmes based themselves at Tauion (Tavium, location uncertain). They organised a system of four ‘tetrarchies’ to each tribe, each of which sent twenty-five representatives to a great council that would handle matters of national importance. The heavily-Hellenicised descendants of these tribes formed a kingdom in the first century BC which quickly became a Roman client state.

(Information by Peter Kessler and Edward Dawson, with additional information from The La Tene Celtic Belgae Tribes in England: Y-Chromosome Haplogroup R-U152 – Hypothesis C, David K Faux, from Commentarii in Epistulam ad Galatas II, 3 = Patrologia Latina 26, 357, St Jerome, from Guide for Greece, Pausanias, and from External Links: Journal of Celtic Studies in Eastern Europe and Asia-Minor, and The Works of Julius Caesar: Gallic Wars, and Geography, Strabo (H C Hamilton & W Falconer, London, 1903, Perseus Online Edition).)

The questions that have to be answered are: (a) In which of the two senses is “Galatia” used by Paul and Peter? (b) What did Luke mean by Galatic region or territory? These questions have not merely geographical import; they bear most closely, and exercise determining influence, on many points in the biography, chronology, missionary work and methods of Paul.

The name was introduced into Asia after 278-277 B.C., when a large body of migrating Gauls (Galatai in Greek) crossed over from Europe at the invitation of Nikomedes, king of Bithynia; after ravaging a great part of Western Asia Minor they were gradually confined to a district, and boundaries were fixed for them after 232 B.C. Thus, originated the independent state of Galatia, inhabited by three Gaulish tribes, Tolistobogioi, Tektosages and Trokmoi, with three city-centers, Pessinus, Ankyra and Tavia (Tavion in Strabo), who had brought their wives and families with them, and therefore continued to be a distinct Gaulish race and stock (which would have been impossible if they had come as simple warriors who took wives from the conquered inhabitants). The Gaulish language was apparently imposed on all the old inhabitants, who remained in the country as an inferior caste. The Galatai soon adopted the country religion, alongside of their own; the latter they retained at least as late as the 2nd century after Christ, but it was politically important for them to maintain and exercise the powers of the old priesthood, as at Pessinus, where the Galatai shared the office with the old priestly families.

c.300 BC
The last stages of Hallstatt culture sees Celts involved in a great expansion into southern and eastern Europe. Tribes infiltrate across the Danube to enter the land on the southern edge of the Eastern Alps, in the form of the Latovici, Serapili, Sereti, and Taurisci. The native communities in the hinterland of the Adriatic between Carinthia and Carniola are relatively rapidly assimilated by the Celtic newcomers, soon losing their identity completely. The migration turns into a powerful juggernaut as it enters the Balkans to come up against the Thracian and Greek kingdoms. It is unclear whether later La Tène elements of Celtic culture are also involved, but it is entirely possible.

c.282 – 281 BC
Gauls who are settled in Pannonia begin a series of campaigns southwards towards Thrace under the leadership of Cambaules. The first two campaigns see Cambaules and his leading veterans divide their followers, sending one part against the Thracians and Triballi under Cerethrius, a second against Paeonia under Brennus and Acichorius, and a third against the Macedonians and Illyrians under Bolgios.

279 BC
Despite ruling both the Lysimachian empire and Macedonia, and having his main rival, the Antigonid King Antigonus II Gonatas bottled up in his own capital, Ptolemy II Ceraunus is killed in the invasion of Greece by the contingent under Bolgios. The kingdom is plunged into anarchy as the Celts invade further into Greece, and only the Aetolians seem to be able to take the lead in defending Greek territory.

278 – 277 BC
Brennus and Acichorius lead the third campaign by the Celts, although this is eventually defeated by a force led by the Aetolians. Following victory at Thermopylae, they advance to Delphi in 278 BC where they are routed by the Greek army, and then suffer a crushing defeat (under Cerethrius) at the hands of the Antigonid King Antigonus II in 277 BC. With Brennus dead, they retreat from Greece and pass through Thrace to enter into Asia Minor, although a small contingent (around 20,00 people, half of whom are warriors) under the leadership of Liutarius and Leonnarius already seems to have made the journey in 278 BC, with the rest merely following a now-established route in their wake.
These Celts in Anatolia (centred on lands that are taken from Antigonid Phrygia) form tribal regions that are based around each of the three main constituents of the confederation. The Tectosages base themselves at Ancyra (modern Ankara, with their leaders shown below in black), while the Tolistoboges settle at Gordion (to the west of Ankara, shown in green), and the Trocmes concentrate themselves at Tauion (shown in red), all in Anatolia. A separate kingdom is established in Thrace, at the city of Tilis (shown in light grey).

The far larger remnant of Gauls who remain in the Balkans join together to form a confederation that finally settles at the junction of the rivers Savus and Danube in the Balkans. They adopt a name which highlights their acceptance of this territory as their new home, taking the mountain’s name itself as the ‘people of the Scord’ – the Scordisci. They probably pick up elements of many of the local peoples along the way, Dacians, Illyrians, and Thracians. From there they raid into Macedonia, weakening the kingdom and later forcing a good many of the Roman governors there to campaign against them during the late second and early first centuries BC.

278 – ? BC
Liutarius

278 – ? BC
Leonnarius

c.278 BC
Outside of Anatolia, the westernmost portion of Galatia is the Celtic kingdom that is established at Tilis (or Tylis, Tyle). This city in eastern Thrace and its Celtic occupiers are both mentioned by Polybius in relation to Commontorios setting up his own kingdom in the wake of the Celtic rampage through the Balkans. The city of Tilis is located near the eastern edge of the Haemus (Balkan) Mountains in what is now eastern Bulgaria (the modern Bulgarian village of Tulovo in Stara Zagora province now occupies the site).

c.278 – c.250 BC
Commontorios / Kommotorios

275 BC
The Galatians seem to be expanding the territory they command, presenting a growing threat to the eastern kingdoms in Anatolia. The Seleucid king in Syria, Antiochus I, attacks the Galatians from the east. Defeating them at the Battle of the Elephants, he pushes back their borders and, allegedly, gains the title ‘soter’ (meaning ‘saviour’) thanks to his victory.

273 BC
The Celts invade Thrace again, destroying the Thracian kingdom and forcing the Greek aristocracy to escape to the colonies bordering the Black Sea. The kingdom of Galatia now covers territory from the lower Balkans to Anatolia. Its victorious creators settle down to life that is fairly traditional, although they have adopted an internal organisation that is much enhanced, with separate judges and military commanders who are all subject to the regional tetrarch. Some Celts at least learn to read Greek, although whether any records are kept by the Celts themselves in any language, Greek or otherwise, is doubtful.

230 BC
The city of Pergamum has been ruled as an Hellenic domain of the Lysimachian empire (during the lifetime of Satrap Philetaerus), with the city being turned into a fortress to house many of the Lysimachian riches. It is only with the success now of Attalus against the Galatian Celts that an independent kingdom is proclaimed in 230 BC, although it still remains within Greece’s sphere of influence.

? – c.218 BC
Kavaros

214 BC
The Thracians eject the Celtic kingdom of Galatia from Greece and fully restore Thracian rule. Only the Celtic kingdom at Tilis in eastern Thrace remains in Celtic hands. The early Galatian kingdom (or rather, confederation) has over-extended itself by claiming too much territory. Now it faces pressure from east and west and its borders contract.

212 BC
The Celtic kingdom that is based at the city of Tilis (or Tylis) in eastern Thrace is attacked by Pleuratus, would-be king of Thrace who may reign in opposition to the already-established Seuthes IV. The kingdom is apparently destroyed by the action, as is the city itself.

c.200 BC
By now Galatia has been settled for almost a century around the River Halys and the Phrygian plain – the poorest parts of Anatolia. According to Pliny the Elder, it lies ‘above’ Phrygia and includes the greater part of the territory taken from that province, along with its former capital at Gordion (Gordium). The Gauls of these parts are called the Tolistobogi (Tolistoboges), the Voturi and the Ambitouti. The latter seem to be divisions of the Tolistoboges, never apparently having been mentioned in history at any time prior to this appearance.

The Gauls of Maeonia and Paphlagonia are called the Trocmi (Trocmes). Cappadocia stretches along to the north-west of Galatia, with its most fertile regions being in the possession of the Tectosages and Teutobodiaci. The latter is another new group, or division, presumably from the main host of Tectosages.

Transference to Rome:

The Galatian state of the Three Tribes lasted till 25 B.C., governed first by a council and by tetrarchs, or chiefs of the twelve divisions (four to each tribe) of the people, then, after 63 B.C., by three kings. Of these, Deiotaros succeeded in establishing himself as sole king, by murdering the two other tribal kings; and after his death in 40 B.C. his power passed to Castor and then to Amyntas, 36-25 B.C. Amyntas bequeathed his kingdom to Rome; and it was made a Roman province (Dion Cass. 48, 33, 5; Strabo, 567, omits Castor). Amyntas had ruled also parts of Phrygia, Pisidia, Lycaonia and Isauria. The new province included these parts, and to it were added Paphlagonia 6 B.C., part of Pontus 2 B.C. (called Pontus Galaticus in distinction from Eastern Pontus, which was governed by King Polemon and styled Polemoniacus), and in 64 also Pontus Polemoniacus. Part of Lycaonia was non-Roman and was governed by King Antiochus; from 41 to 72 A.D. Laranda belonged to this district, which was distinguished as Antiochiana regio from the Roman region Lycaonia called Galatica.

1. The Roman Province:

This large province was divided into regiones for administrative purposes; and the regiones coincided roughly with the old national divisions Pisidia, Phrygia (including Antioch, Iconium, Apollonia), Lycaonia (including Derbe, Lystra and a district organized on the village-system), etc. See Calder in Journal of Roman Studies, 1912. This province was called by the Romans Galatia, as being the kingdom of Amyntas (just like the province Asia, which also consisted of a number of different countries as diverse and alien as those of province Galatia, and was so called because the Romans popularly and loosely spoke of the kings of that congeries of countries as kings of Asia). The extent of both names, Asia and Galatia, in Roman language, varied with the varying bounds of each province. The name “Galatia” is used to indicate the province, as it was at the moment, by Ptolemy, Pliny v.146, Tacitus Hist. ii0.9; Ann. xiii. 35; later chroniclers, Syncellus, Eutropius, and Hist. Aug. Max. et Balb. 7 (who derived it from earlier authorities, and used it in the old sense, not the sense customary in their own time); and in inscriptions CIL, III, 254, 272 (Eph. Ep. v.51); VI, 1408, 1409, 332; VIII, 11028 (Mommsen rightly, not Schmidt), 18270, etc. It will be observed that these are almost all Roman sources, and (as we shall see) express a purely Roman view. If Paul used the name “Galatia” to indicate the province, this would show that he consistently and naturally took a Roman view, used names in a Roman connotation, and grouped his churches according to Roman provincial divisions; but that is characteristic of the apostle, who looked forward from Asia to Rome (Acts 19:21), aimed at imperial conquest and marched across the Empire from province to province (Macedonia, Achaia, Asia are always provinces to Paul). On the other hand, in the East and the Greco-Asiatic world, the tendency was to speak of the province either as the Galatic Eparchia (as at Iconium in 54 A.D., CIG, 3991), or by enumeration of its regiones (or a selection of the regiones). The latter method is followed in a number of inscriptions found in the province (CIL, III, passim). Now let us apply these contemporary facts to the interpretation of the narrative of Luke.

III. The Narrative of Luke.

1. Stages of Evangelization of Province:

The evangelization of the province began in Acts 13:14. The stages are:

(1) the audience in the synagogue, Acts 13:42;

(2) almost the whole city, 13:44;

(3) the whole region, i.e. a large district which was affected from the capital (as the whole of Asia was affected from Ephesus 19:10);

(4) Iconium another city of this region: in 13:51 no boundary is mentioned;

(5) a new region Lycaonia with two cities and surrounding district (14:6);

(6) return journey to organize the churches in (a) Lystra, (b) Iconium and Antioch (the secondary

COMMAGENE, the portion of southwestern Asia Minor (modern Turkey) bordered on the east by the Euphrates river, on the west by the Taurus mountains, and on the south by the plains of northern Syria. It was part of the Achaemenid empire and its successor kingdoms and did not achieve status as an independent kingdom until the mid-2nd century B.C.E. Commagene is unique in that indigenous documentation is more extensive than the notices in Greek and Roman sources; nevertheless, that documentation, which consists of official inscriptions in Greek, is skewed: The royal monuments of Antiochus I (ca. 69-30s b.c.e.) predominate, and the inscriptions (identified here by letters, following Wagner, 1983; and Waldmann) reflect his claims for himself and his dynasty.

Commagene controlled Euphrates crossings from Mesopotamia and was thus the favored invasion route for Persian troops moving west (Cicero, Ad Familiares 8.10.1; Strabo, 16.746, 749; Appian, Syriaca 48; Dio Cassius, 49.13; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 5.86). The kingdom became wealthy from trade and agriculture, particularly on the fertile lands around the capital, Samosata (Strabo, 16.749; cf. 12.535 on fruit trees). Although the means by which the rulers of Commagene developed their land economically are not entirely clear, the existence of great wealth is obvious from the array of royal monuments, the number of festivals celebrated throughout the kingdom, invaders’ expectations of booty (Plutarch, Antony 34), and contemporary notices of royal wealth (Tacitus, Annales 2.81 ).

Political history. Under Achaemenid rule Commagene was administered by a minor official, stationed at Samosata or a similar site and responsible for protecting the Euphrates crossings. Antiochus claimed to be descended from Achaemenid royalty through Orontes, the noted satrap of Armenia in the 4th century b.c.e. (e.g.. Plutarch, Artoxerxes 27); this claim suggests that in the Achaemenid period Commagene may have been part of the satrapy of Armenia and that intermarriage among Persian and Persianized nobility was common in the region. During the Hellenistic period Commagene was part of the Seleucid empire and was at times subject to the nominally Seleucid dynasts of Armenia. Antiochus’ royal inscriptions at Arsameia on the Euphrates (modern Gerger; inscription G) and Arsameia on the Nymphaios (modern Eski Kahta; inscription A) include references to his ancestor Arsames, “founder” of both cities. This Arsames can be identified with the Arsames whom Polyaenus (4.17) described as an Armenian dynast supporting the rebel Seleucid Antiochus Hierax in the mid-3nd century b.c.e. Arsames fortified Arsameia on the Nymphaios as part of his building of a power base against the legitimate Seleucid king, Seleucus II Callinicus (246-26 b.c.e.).

The history of the kingdom of Commagene begins with the reign of Ptolemaeus, a Seleucid officer who became king in 163 or 162 b.c.e. Despite Antiochus’ grandiose claims, the royal family of Commagene was probably an indigenous and somewhat Hellenized dynasty, the early members of which had been assigned Greek titles in the Seleucid administrative hierarchy (e.g. Ptolemaeus Epistates; Diodorus Siculus, 31.19a). At first Commagene was a third-ranking power, weaker than the former Achaemenid satrapies of Armenia and Cappadocia, which were then in conflict over the region of Sophene (Diodorus Siculus, 31.22). Ptolemaeus took advantage of such strife to establish Commagene as a kingdom, which he immediately enlarged by occupying northern strong points in Melitene, part of Cappadocia. His successor, his son Samus, is known only from coins, on which he is represented in both Seleucid and Persian style, and from his grandson Antiochus’ monuments at Nimrud Dagh (inscription Nfa/Nfb = OGI 396 in part) and Arsameia on the Euphrates (inscription Gf = OGI 402).

The reigns of Mithradates I and Antiochus I are better documented. Commagene was clearly a minor power with a limited range of politic

Though the events of 53 BC had seen the comprehensive failure of the Carrhae campaign, the First Romano-Parthian War was far from over. We must therefore look at the aftermath of the campaign and the other years of the war before we can draw any overall conclusions about this period of history.

Rome after Carrhae

For Roman power in the east, the disastrous Carrhae campaign had a number of effects. In the first place, the Roman province of Syria (a long term Parthian target) now lay virtually defenceless. The legions stationed there had been taken by Crassus on his invasion of Parthia and had died along with him. Thus the province of Syria had neither governor, nor garrison. All it did have was around 10,000 legionaries (from across the seven destroyed legions) who had made it back from Carrhae. In terms of officers, the most senior man in Roman Syria was Gaius Cassius Longinus, who only held the rank of pro-quaestor and whose military capabilities had been seriously called into question during the Carrhae campaign.

If this was not enough, then we need to consider the state of the Roman Empire in the east as a whole. The Pompeian settlement which had established Roman hegemony in the east was based on the power, image and threat of Rome, rather than a present physical force. The only territories that were Roman provinces were Asia, Bithynia & Pontus, Cilicia and Syria. Outside of Syria the only one of these with more than garrison strength was Cilicia, and that had less than 15,000 men stationed there. Most of the region was composed of client kingdoms who owed their allegiance to Rome due to a combination of past obligations and Rome’s overwhelming military superiority; and in matters of statecraft, past obligations tended to count for little. These kingdoms remained allied to Rome through the fear and respect that the Roman army had instilled in them. Thus the defeat at Carrhae had done more than simply cost the Romans a commander and his men; it had devastated their military reputation in the region at the expense of their neighbour and rival.

Of these client kingdoms, the greatest of them, Armenia, had already moved from the Roman sphere of influence back into the Parthian one. In the region of the northern Euphrates lay two minor client kingdoms: Osroene and Commagene. Abgarus, the ruler of Osroene, wasted no time in affirming his allegiance to Orodes and dismissing any talk of him aiding Crassus (as seen earlier) as being nothing more than a double bluff. He probably attempted to claim some of the credit for leading Crassus into defeat at Carrhae. The Kingdom of Commagene appears to have remained loyal to Rome in the short term, but could do little about the Parthians crossing the Euphrates and invading them, other than warn the Romans. Should the Parthians do so, then Commagene would have to swear allegiance to Orodes. Cappadocia had just gained a new young king, whose grip on the throne was tenuous at best and so was of little use to Rome and actually gave them another source of concern.261 This left the kingdom of Judea in the south, which had been a perpetual source of revolt for the Seleucids and had already twice required Roman intervention in the past decade (Pompey in 63 and Gabinius in 55). Given their past reputation and perpetual internal chaos, it is not surprising that when the news of the Roman defeat at Carrhae reached them, yet another anti-Roman insurrection broke out.Even within Syria itself, anti-Roman elements were agitating against the Romans. All in all, the situation that Rome faced in the east was grave. Leadership and decisive action would be needed by the Senate, and Rome’s two surviving triumvirs, if the situation was to be salvaged.

Unfortunately for the Romans in the east and the Republic as a whole, the Senate and Rome’s leading men were apparently too busy with domestic politics to bother about a catastrophic situation on the edges of their empire. For much of 53 BC the Republic was without formal government. It was not until July that consuls for that year were elected (rather than during the previous year). This situation was symptomatic of the chaos that had broken out in Rome. Following Crassus’ departure for the east, Caesar became bogged down in Gaul and an abortive invasion of Britain, leaving Pompey to manage affairs in Rome. Furthermore, a bribery scandal had broken out during the elections for the consuls of 53 BC, which resulted first in political deadlock and then outright chaos, as the elections were continually prevented from being held. Old political scores were being settled both in the courts (Gabinius was tried twice for his actions in Egypt and finally convicted) and ultimately on the streets, with Clodius and Milo both re-arming their gangs and bringing armed fighting onto Rome’s thoroughfares once more. Pompey had to absent himself from Rome to see if the chaos died down. By the time he returned and used his authority and political power to get the elections held for the consuls of 53 BC, attention immediately turned to the elections for the consuls of 52 BC, and thus the whole cycle of political chaos was sparked off once more. It was into this chaos that news of the disaster at Carrhae arrived.

It appears that few tears were shed by the Senate and people of Rome over the loss of Crassus. It also appears that both groups failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation in the east. As for Crassus’ former colleagues, Caesar was still fighting for his life suppressing rebellions that had broken out all over Gaul and even striking out across the Rhine to stabilise his new conquests, and Pompey was trying to hold the situation in Rome together and hoping to profit by it. Therefore neither man had time to worry about the eastern frontier.

In the midst of this turmoil we are unsure how the news of the disaster at Carrhae was received. It came on the heels of a reversal for Caesar in Gaul (a rebellion had broken out, which resulted in the loss of a legionary camp and a whole legion with it). Thus it was possible that Carrhae was seen as one disaster amongst many, which could have lessened its impact on the minds of the people in Rome. It was only after the chaos of 53 and 52 BC had subsided that people had time to assess the defeat, and Crassus’ part in it. However the situation in Rome at this time is difficult to judge because there are large gaps in the surviving collections of Cicero’s letters (our best source for the period), which affect 53 BC in particular. There is no doubt that Cicero would have recorded the news of Carrhae, but regrettably those letters have not survived (appendix two will deal with possible other sources for the Battle of Carrhae).

The year 52 BC opened up with the by-now-familiar sight of election chaos and no fresh consuls elected. The situation got markedly worse when a battle between the gangs of Clodius and Milo ended with the murder of Clodius. In anger his supporters built a funeral pyre inside the Senate House and set light to it, resulting not only in the cremation of Clodius’ body, but also the destruction of the building. This crisis resulted in a proposal being made for an emergency government in the form of a sole consul. The man proposed was Pompey himself, and with the Senate’s backing the Republic chose to have a sole consul for the first time. Pompey cemented his power within Rome and the Senate by hastily arranging to marry the newly-widowed wife of Publius Crassus, which even the Roman elite found somewhat distasteful but which again showed his political acumen by taking advantage of a crisis.

One of the emergency laws which Pompey passed specified that there should be a five year gap between a consul holding office and gaining a provincial command. Naturally, Pompey himself was exempted from this law. It was only as a consequence of this law, and the resultant shortage of provincial governors that it led to, that finally in 51 BC the Senate turned to the issue of the east and its governance.

In what was little more than a provincial house-keeping exercise, the Senate appointed new governors of Cilicia and Syria. In accordance with this new five year rule, they had to appoint men who had been consuls some years before. For Cilicia they chose Marcus Tullius Cicero himself (the consul of 63 BC), who had spent the years following his consulship in writing numerous legal, political and philosophical tracts and working in the courts. For Syria they chose Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (the former Consul of 59 BC) who had spent most of his consulate closeted in his own house looking for ill-omens with which to veto the legislation of his colleague, Julius Caesar. Neither man therefore inspired any confidence in their ability to handle a military crisis. To show just how little the Senate understood of the situation in the east, Cicero’s proposal that fresh legions should be levied in Italy in order to strengthen the forces on the borders of Syria and Cilicia was vetoed by the consul Sulpicius.266 Though the Romans may not have thought it, we are fortunate that Cicero was one of the men chosen to go to the east, as his numerous surviving letters give us a first-hand testimony of events there.

Thus the reaction in Rome to the catastrophic Carrhae campaign, and its perilous position in the east as a whole, was one of almost complete disinterest. As always happened in Roman Republican politics, the affairs of Rome itself took precedence over the affairs of their empire. Those men who did realise the threat, and Cicero must count amongst them, especially once he had been sent out to the east, did not have sufficient political weight to do anything about it. The only men with enough political power in the 50s BC were Crassus’ colleagues, Pompey and Caesar, and both men were too busy with their own problems and affairs, and with each other’s, to turn their attention to the crisis in the east. The death of Crassus may have been a disaster for Rome, but it was also an opportunity for Pompey. His old rival of over twenty years had been removed and it is no surprise that Pompey’s third consulship was a sole one (the first two having been with his equal, Crassus, in 70 and 55 BC). Pompey now saw himself as a man without equals.

Thus the Romans showed total disregard for the east and the potential Parthian threat. The defence of Syria, and Rome’s whole position in the east, fell upon the shoulders of one man, Gaius Cassius, who had less than two legions of Carrhae survivors with which to accomplish this.

Parthia after Carrhae

Parthia, however, after the victorious Carrhae campaign, had just the opposite problem: how to build on the successes of 53 BC? Once again we suffer from a lack of non-Roman sources here. For the remainder of 53 BC the Parthians did not appear to cross the Euphrates, and Dio tells us that, quite logically, they spent the rest of the year reasserting control of the territories east of the Euphrates. The Roman garrisons may have fled along with Crassus, but Parthian control needed to be reinforced in these towns considering how easily they had gone over to the Romans. The same would have been true of the cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which were known to harbour pro-Roman sympathies and which had gone over to Mithradates III during the civil war of 55/54 BC.

A full-scale invasion of Syria would take some time to plan, especially since the bulk of the army was with Orodes in Armenia and they had not been expected to mount an offensive operation so soon, if at all. Orodes had another headache: who would lead this invasion? The obvious choice would have been Surenas, but Orodes had already had him murdered to secure his own throne. Whilst this brutal and treacherous action may have been in Orodes’ own best interests, it certainly was not in Parthia’s, for it robbed the Parthians of one of the most talented generals they ever possessed. Not only that, but it is unlikely that the Suren clan (Parthia’s most powerful, after the Arsacids), would have taken the murder of their chief easily. So the murder of Surenas may have stirred up trouble within Parthia, which would need to be dealt with before offensive action could be taken.

Whilst this internal reorganisation was going on, however, there were certain measures the Parthians could take to strengthen their position against Rome. Firstly, the Parthians could secure their alliances with some of the smaller states of the region. Certainly the area of Osroene quickly came back into the Parthian fold, and it is probable that a number of the other semi-autonomous Arab tribes that bordered the Roman and Parthian empires would have switched their loyalties to Parthia. Secondly, Parthia could encourage pro-Parthian elements in both Syria and Judea to overthrow Roman rule and destabilise the region prior to a Parthian invasion; ironically just as Rome had done to the Mesopotamian region in 55 BC (by sending Mithradates III back to stir up a civil war). In Judea, little such encouragement was needed and the result was perfect for Parthia – a full-scale insurrection against Roman rule.

52 BC – The Calm before the Storm

The year following Carrhae was an unusually quite one in terms of the war between Rome and Parthia. Rome was still too busy with domestic politics to bother about the east and Parthia was still going through an internal reorganisation. For one man, however, it was a year that would be a highly active one, and one that would go some way to restoring his reputation. That man was Gaius Cassius Longinus. We know little of Cassius prior to the Carrhae campaign. He came from a consular family which had a steady, but unspectacular, lineage in Republican terms.267 Given the later offices which he held, we can estimate a date of birth of somewhere in the late 80s BC for Cassius.268 Thus he was still a young man in his late twenties or early thirties when he was taken under Marcus Crassus’ wing, as had been done with many young ambitious aristocrats (including Julius Caesar). By the autumn of 53 BC he found himself, by process of elimination, as the governor of Syria and the man in charge of defending Roman interests in the whole region in the face of an impending Parthian invasion. Given his track record during the Carrhae campaign (he had fallen for Surenas’ ruse and deserted his commander), the omens were not looking good. However, when put in this high pressure situation at such a young age, he appears to have come into his own.

For the events of 52 BC, Josephus is again our best source; Cicero had not yet been appointed and thus he largely ignored the situation. Josephus states that the Parthians pursued the Romans across the Euphrates, which does contradict Dio’s account . However, it would have been a good Parthian tactic to send raiding parties across the Euphrates whilst they were preparing for a full scale invasion. Meanwhile, Cassius formed the survivors of Carrhae, including at least 800 cavalry, into two legions and set about repelling the incursions, which he did with some considerable success.270 Once the Parthian raids of early 52 BC had been repulsed, Cassius set about securing the region by tackling the growing problem of the Jewish insurrection. This rebellion was led by a man called Peitholaus, who was attempting to revive the rebellion led by King Aristobulus, which had been crushed by Pompey in 63 BC. Cassius dealt with this fresh rebellion in similarly brutal fashion. With only two legions he stormed the city of Taricheae and enslaved over thirty thousand inhabitants who had been supporting the rebellion; Peitholaus was executed. In crushing this rebellion, Cassius had the friendship and support of an influential Judean Arab by the name of Antipater, who was to become the father of the infamous King Herod the Great. When he was confident that Judea had been pacified, Cassius returned to the Euphrates region to deal with further Parthian incursions. Once again it is reported that he did so successfully.

Thus for Cassius and ultimately Rome, 52 BC had brought some much-needed stability and some limited successes. Roman Syria was no longer leaderless or undefended. Cassius had formed the survivors of Carrhae into two efficient legions, had routed a number of Parthian border incursions and had successfully crushed an insurrection in Judea. He had done so with a ferocity that would have made any other anti-Roman elements in the region think twice. All in all it had been a good year for Cassius, who had restored both his own and Rome’s reputation. Even so, some of the responsibility for these Roman successes must be laid at the door of the Parthians, who wasted a whole year’s campaigning in internal re-organisation and planning. This year-long respite allowed Cassius to regroup and forge an effective defence force in Syria to secure the border and restore Roman authority over the region. Again we can see the indecisive hand of Orodes behind this delay. Had Surenas still been alive then it is highly unlikely that the Romans would have had the luxury of eighteen months to await the Parthian invasion. Nevertheless, repulsing border raids was one thing, repulsing a full-scale invasion was another.

51 BC – The Parthian Invasion of Roman Syria

On 14 June 51 BC, as he was on his way from Italy to take up his command in Cilicia, Cicero wrote to his friend Atticus expressing the sentiment ‘Only let the Parthians keep quiet and luck be on my side’.272 He was soon to be disappointed.

At some point during 52 BC, Orodes finally made the decision to invade and conquer Roman Syria. He also came to a decision on who was to lead the expedition, naturally not wanting to take the risk himself. He opted for a joint command and a blend of youth and experience. Nominally in command of the invasion was one of his own sons, Pacorus, who appears to have been Orodes’ favourite son and his heir. Aiding him was a veteran Parthian noble general, Osaces.273 Thus Orodes appears to have opted for a ‘safety first’ mentality to the campaign. Clearly he did not want another Surenas, but recognised the need to temper his son’s youthfulness with an experienced soldier.

We can track the prelude to the first Parthian invasion of the Roman Empire through Cicero’s letters as he crossed the Mediterranean en route to Cilicia. From Athens on 6 July 51 BC he wrote:

Of the Parthian, there is no whisper. As for the future, heaven be my help.

Then on 27 July, from Asia Minor:

Meanwhile certain welcome reports are coming in, first of quiet from the Parthian region.

Having reached Cilicia he wrote on 3rd August:

I reached Laodicea on 31st July. My arrival was most eagerly anticipated and widely acclaimed.

We can also see how little Cicero was looking forward to his military duties from this:

Contrary to my inclination and quite unexpectedly, I find myself under the necessity of setting out to govern a province.

And, with growing desperation, this:

For mercy’s sake, as you are staying in Rome, do pray first and foremost build up a powerful defensive position to ensure that my term remains only one year.

How inadequate he thought his resources is also made plain:

And to think that while our friend [Pompey] has his huge army, I have a nominal force of two skeleton legions. But I’ll stick it out as best I can so long as it’s only for a year.

By 14 August, rumours were beginning to reach Cicero which made him think that it was not going to be his year:

Of the Parthian there is no whisper, but travellers say that some of our cavalry have been cut to pieces by the barbarians. Bibulus [the new governor of Syria] is not so much thinking of getting to his province even now.

By 28 August Cicero received the news that he had been dreading:

Ambassadors sent to me by Antiochus of Commagene have arrived at my camp near Iconium on the 28th August, and having reported to me that the son of the Parthian King, whom the sister of the Armenian King had married, had reached the banks of the Euphrates with a large Parthian force and a large army of many other nations besides, and that it was said that the Armenian King intended an attack upon Cappadocia.

By 20 September Cicero gave a further grim assessment of the situation:

the Parthians have crossed the Euphrates under Pacorus, son of King Orodes of Parthia, with almost their entire force. There is no word of Bibulus being in Syria. Cassius is in the town of Antioch with his entire army.

Despite this, his major concern is still for his own governorship:

but first and foremost (ensure) that nothing is added to my responsibilities or my tenure twixt the slaughter and the offering [twixt cup and lip] as they say

He then gives a brutally honest summary of his own position:

For with an army as feeble as mine and so little in the way of allies, loyal ones particularly, my best resource is winter. If that comes without the enemy invading my province first, my only fear is that the Senate will not want to let Pompey go in view of the dangers at home. But if they send someone else by the spring I shall not worry, as long as my own term is not extended.

Thus we have Cicero’s strategy for dealing with the first full-blown Parthian invasion of the Roman empire: pray winter arrives before the Parthians do and hope that the Senate either sends Pompey out to deal with the Parthians, or a replacement for Cicero as governor of Cilicia. Fortunately for the Romans, the Parthians did not invade Cilicia, but made straight for the jugular of Roman Syria.

Cicero’s letter of 28 August gives us a fair idea of the Parthian plan and the nature of their attack, though he does not provide us with an overall figure for the Parthian numbers, which he probably did not have himself at the time. Fortunately, we do possess Cicero’s report to the Senate, sent at some point in the autumn of 51 BC, which outlines the whole situation and provides us with invaluable information:

I received a dispatch from Tarcondimotus, who is regarded as our most loyal ally, beyond Mount Taurus, and the best friend of the Roman people. He reported that Pacorus, son of Orodes, the Parthian king, had crossed the Euphrates with a very large force of Parthian cavalry, and pitched his camp at Tyba, and that a serious uprising had been stirred up in the province of Syria. On the same day I received a dispatch dealing with the same incidents from Jamblichus, the leading tribesman of the Arabs, a man who is generally considered to be loyally disposed and friendly to our Republic. On the receipt of this information, I fully understood that our allies had no firmly established opinions, and were wavering in their expectation of a revolution.285

From these two pieces of testimony we are able to piece together the Parthian battleplan for their invasion of Syria. Pacorus and Osaces crossed the Euphrates and headed deep into Syria with a large army. This force was mostly composed of cavalry, thus copying Surenas’ tactics, as well a large contingent of allied forces, most likely to be from the tributary Arab territories. Some commentators have criticised this force as being nothing more than a large raid, rather than an army of conquest, because of the preponderance of cavalry.286However, this view fails to understand the subtle nature of the Parthian plan. The invasion force was not there to take every city in the province by storm, but to defeat the remaining Roman forces, and then be invited in by the inhabitants of the Syrian cities, who would want to overthrow Roman rule. In many ways this appears to have been a copy of their highly successful invasion of Mesopotamia in the 140s BC, where, after the Seleucid forces were defeated, the Parthians appear to have been welcomed into the cities by the inhabitants.

To ensure the success of this strategy, the Parthians had engineered a general uprising throughout Syria, through use of agents and pro-Parthian forces. There would have been many inhabitants of Syria, who believed that they had more in common with Mesopotamia and the east than with the inhabitants of Italy, and would have seen their being part of an eastern empire as the more logical. If nothing else, the defeat of Rome at Carrhae had shown that it was Parthia, rather than Rome, which appeared to be the ascendant power. This plan also explains the predominant cavalry element of the Parthian army; they were copying Surenas’ tactics and had designed this force not to storm cities, but simply to defeat and destroy the remaining Roman forces in the region.